Prototype News

Northstar service between Minneapolis and Big Lake, Minn., was shuttered Jan. 4, with buses replacing trains along the route, according to local media reports.

The Minnesota Star Tribune and other media outlets reported in February 2025 the potential elimination of the commuter rail service and in early August 2025 that Metropolitan Council meeting documents proposed a January 2026 end date. The Met Council voted on Aug. 27 to end the service, the Tribune reported; “the last Northstar train will run … after the final Vikings regular season home game at U.S. Bank Stadium,” and the Met Council on Jan. 5 will begin running buses to replace rail service.

“This was a challenging decision,” the Tribune reported Deb Barber, Chair of Met Council’s transportation committee, as saying in August. “But we also know that we have to take the time to look at the service we provide to see that they’re efficient and effective.” Northstar’s 2025 operating budget was $18.6 million, the newspaper said, and the “Met Council estimates the bus service will cost $3.5 million in 2026.”

According to the paper, the “Met Council’s plans to ‘preserve key assets’ for future rail between cities and local use are in development, it said in a statement.”

The Tribune reported that Dave Butts, Vice President of the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005, which represents 26 Northstar workers, “has vocally opposed ending Northstar. “They’ve never given Northstar a chance,” he said.

As of Jan. 5, 2026, the Northstar corridor has transitioned from about 40 train trips per week to nearly 400 weekly bus trips (see map below).

“MnDOT’s recent Twin Cities – St. Cloud-Fargo/Moorhead Corridor study makes it clear we can provide more cost-effective transit service in the corridor currently being served by Northstar Commuter Rail,” the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) and the Metropolitan Council said in a Feb. 24, 2025, joint statement, according to FOX 9 KMSP. “As the world and consumer demand changes, we must be willing to be flexible and innovative to offer better service while saving dollars. We have jointly started the process to explore transitioning to bus service in this corridor. That process includes working with our federal partners and our rail partners at BNSF Railway, who we have appreciated as a critical [host freight rail] partner. In the coming months, we will have more information, including timeline information and projected future savings. For Minnesotans who currently utilize this service, we are committed to working with you to ensure you have access to high-quality transportation in this corridor.”

The MnDOT study (download below) “found that transitioning to bus service between Minneapolis and St. Cloud would cost millions less than the status quo,” according to the Minnesota Star Tribune. “It costs about $12 million annually to operate Northstar, a budget that would shrink to $2 million if buses were used.”

“This is the beginning to finally end Northstar service, with its ridiculously low ridership, its ridiculously huge operating subsidies and its ridiculously expensive maintenance costs,” said Minnesota state Rep. Jon Koznick, a Republican serving District 5A, according to the Tribune.

The 40-mile Northstar service in the Northstar corridor opened Nov. 16, 2009, between downtown Minneapolis and the northern city of Big Lake (see map, right); it was originally envisioned to link with St. Cloud, but connects to that city via bus. From 2011 through 2019, it carried between 2,200 and 3,300 weekday riders during the morning and evening peak commute hours; it also featured special event service on evenings and weekends for Minnesota’s Twins, Vikings, and University of Minnesota Gopher sporting events. MotivePower (Wabtec) MP36PH-3Cs power the trains, which comprise Alstom (originally Bombardier) bilevels. 

The COVID-19 pandemic led to a dramatic ridership drop of nearly 98%—just 60 weekday rides in April 2020, according to the Metropolitan Council, which is the regional policy-making body providing transit, wastewater collection and treatment, and affordable housing services in the seven-county Twin Cities metro area, and is charged under state law with establishing regional growth policies and long-range plans for transportation, aviation, water resources, and regional parks. In 2021, daily ridership peaked in October at 346 daily rides or just over 13% of the October 2019 pre-pandemic level. In 2022, Northstar carried around 300 daily rides.

While employees have been returning to in-person work, “Northstar’s recovery has been lackluster, with just over 127,000 riders last year, renewing Republican lawmakers’ chorus to shut it down,” the Tribune reported. The service provides four weekday trains and no weekend service unless there is a special event.

“‘We know travel patterns have changed’ since the pandemic,” Met Council Chair Charlie Zelle said, according to the Tribune. “He said bus service would likely be more frequent to reflect the new paradigm.”

MnDOT was charged with conducting the Twin Cities – St. Cloud-Fargo/Moorhead Corridor study by the state legislature. The purpose: “to conduct an analysis and evaluation of options for development of transit and rail service improvements in the corridor between the Minnesota cities of St. Paul, Minneapolis, Coon Rapids, St. Cloud and Moorhead, and Fargo, N.Dak.” It assessed alternatives for transit service in the corridor and the elimination of Northstar commuter rail in conjunction with those alternatives.

According to the Tribune, the “study laid out different options for Northstar, but didn’t recommend that the service be terminated altogether. It explored the potential cost to extend service to the Fargo/Moorhead area, either by extending Northstar’s route, by expanding Amtrak service or by combining bus and train service.” MnDOT, it noted, is studying expanding Amtrak’s Chicago-to-St. Paul Borealis service to Coon Rapids and St. Cloud.

If the Northstar service were to end, it would involve “unspooling contracts” between MnDOT, Met Council, BNSF, the state of Minnesota, and the Federal Transit Administration, which provided a Full-Funding Grant Agreement for the $320 million project, according to the Tribune. “The federal government and possibly the state would have to be reimbursed if Northstar shut down, athough it’s unclear how much,” the paper said. “Congress would have to approve any waiver of those costs.”

The Tribune added that “[t]he remaining interest in Northstar is about $30 million to $35 million, according to the report, not including property and buildings along the line, which would need to be appraised to determine current market value.”

“I reviewed the report, and it looks like one of the many studies I have seen that tells the client what the client wants to hear,” commented Railway Age Contributing Editor David Peter Alan in February 2025. “In this case, it’s that the Northstar service is not worth keeping, and that it would be a better deal just to run a bus. While I’m not sufficiently familiar with the subject matter of the study, I rode the Northstar years ago, after getting off Amtrak’s Empire Builder at St. Cloud, spending the day there, and taking the connecting bus and then the Northstar into Minneapolis. The operation was not conducive to encouraging ridership. 

“The service today consists of three peak-hour trains in prevailing direction and one in reverse direction, with no service at any other time. From what I remember and some research I did, all stations are park-and-ride, with the towns some distance away from them. There has never been service to St. Cloud, except taking the train halfway there to Big Lake and a bus the rest of the way. Service outside the commuting peak has also been very limited, even when there was a bit of service on the weekends. There was never any interest, as far as I could ascertain, to run a more-robust level of service or to run trains to St. Cloud, which is a destination worth visiting.

“All in all, it does not appear that the Northstar service was ever designed to carry more than the number of commuters who could fill up the spots in the parking lots, which inherently limited its effectiveness in providing mobility in the region. Now a consultant’s report is calling for its termination, so its days are probably numbered. Maybe it’s just an example of how not to design and build a passenger service.”

• A Tale of Twin Cities
• Debate heating over future of Northstar commuter rail

The post Minnesota Shutters Northstar Commuter Rail (UPDATED 1/5) appeared first on Railway Age.

The Surface Transportation Board (STB) “should reject the efforts of a few parties … to delay and prolong this proceeding by claiming the [recently filed Union Pacific-Norfolk Southern] Application [seeking authorization to combine their networks under common ownership and form a U.S. transcontinental] is incomplete,” the two railroads urged in a Jan. 2 filing.

The approximately 6,700-page control application, including verified statements from 19 company witnesses and independent experts, along with more than 142 gigabytes of supporting workpapers, “demonstrates that the proposed transaction presents an unprecedented opportunity to drive growth, enhance competition, and create a more accessible, sustainable, and lower cost supply chain option that will benefit American businesses and consumers,” UP and NS wrote. “The Application contains all the information required by the Board’s merger rules, 49 C.F.R. part 1180, and presents a prima facie case that the proposed transaction is consistent with the public interest. The Board therefore should accept the Application.”

According to UP and NS, the parties claiming that the application is incomplete are “primarily competitors,” who will “experience increased competition as a result of the merger.” They include BNSF, CN, Canadian Pacific Kansas City, and CSX, plus the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA), representing one of the railroads’ largest customer bases.

UP and NS noted that the STB “should also disregard the improper efforts of these same parties to litigate the merits of the Application at this time, directly contradicting the Board’s explicit instructions to the contrary. See Decision No. 7 at 1 (‘[C]omments should solely address whether the application is complete . . . .’).”

In their Jan. 2 filing (scroll down to download) that replies to the parties’ comments, UP and NS explained that:

• “NGFA’s concerns involve merits not completeness” (see p. 4). NGFA, the railroads said, “advances two principal claims. First, NGFA asserts that the Application is incomplete because the discussion of proposed competitive enhancements does not address all of the potential measures referenced as examples in the Board’s 2001 decision promulgating the current rules for major rail consolidations, including trackage rights, reciprocal switching, eliminating interchange commitments, and establishing shared or joint access areas. Second, NGFA contends that the Application’s Service Assurance Plan is incomplete because it purportedly fails to comply with the merger rules’ requirement for a process to compensate shippers for service failures and provides little information on back-up or contingency plans that would involve other rail carriers. Neither assertion is correct.” The Board’s 2001 decision and rules, UP and NS said, “contemplate that applicants retain discretion to propose a transaction-specific approach (including here the Committed Gateway Pricing program, together with the competitive benefits inherent in the transaction itself) to satisfy the Board’s expectation of a special offering to enhance competition. NGFA may disagree with the sufficiency of Applicants’ offering, but such disagreement concerns the merits of Applicants’ proposals, not whether the Application contains the information required by 49 C.F.R. part 1180. NGFA’s objections to the Service Assurance Plan similarly reflect merits disagreements rather than an absence of required information.”

• “The application includes full system impact analyses required by the Board’s rules” (see p. 6). UP and NS told the STB that their “four principal railroad competitors advance a number of baseless claims that the Application fails to provide the full system impact analyses required by 49 C.F.R. § 1180.7(b). Applicants fully complied with the Board’s requirement that they submit full system impact analyses demonstrating the proposed transaction’s impacts on competition within regions of the United States and this nation as a whole … Applicants devoted hundreds of pages of their Application and multiple verified statements, including verified statements from two expert economists, to addressing the proposed transaction’s competitive impacts.” In reference to CN’s comments, UP and NS said their “Application appropriately addresses 3-to-2 and 2-to-1 points” (see p. 7) and “appropriately addresses 2-to-1 shippers” (see p. 9). In reference to CN’s and BNSF’s separate comments, UP and NS said their “Application appropriately addresses actual and projected market shares” (see p. 10). Lastly, in reference to CPKC’s comments, UP and NS said their “Application appropriately addresses geographic competition” (see p. 12) and “downstream effects” (see p. 12).

• The application “appropriately addresses downstream effects” (see p. 14). According to UP and NS, “CSX asserts that Applicants were required to submit ‘evidence’ on downstream effects without specifying why the Application’s evidence was insufficient or what additional evidence CSX thinks is required. BNSF says that the Application’s discussion of downstream issues ‘cannot be what the Board had in mind,’ but fails to identify what exactly it believes is required. CPKC similarly does not explain what ‘real downstream analysis’ it believes was needed.” These arguments, UP and NS told the STB, “are misguided,” as they “fully complied with the ‘downstream effects’ provisions of the Board’s rules, which simply ask applicants to ‘initiate a commentary’ about the impact of likely future mergers on the structure of the industry … The Board’s rules make clear that Applicants are not required to present ‘alternative merger benefit calculations based on specific alternative possible responses’ or to ‘forecast the precise actions of their competitors in response to a merger application.’”

• UP and NS ‘appropriately enumerated and quantified [the] public benefit the merger would generate” (see p. 16). According to the potential merger partners, “CSX complains that Applicants did not identify ‘which of its claimed benefits are achievable through means “short of merger.”’ However, the Board’s rules do not require Applicants to parse through the benefits calculations to determine whether some fraction of the benefits could be obtained without a merger.” UP and NS said they “abundantly satisfied the Board’s requirement that they address whether the claimed benefits could be achieved short of a merger” through six verified statements.

• The application “describes how the merger would enhance competition” (see p. 18). CSX’s and CN’s separate concerns “go to the Applicant’s merits, not its completeness,” UP and NS told the STB. The application, UP and NS said, “contains abundant evidence that the merger will enhance intramodal and intermodal competition,” including how “Committed Gateway Pricing will enhance competition.”

• UP and NS “appropriately produced the data underlying their evidence” (see p. 21). The potential merger partners noted that “the Board should reject BNSF’s and CPKC’s claims that its merger rules require applicants to provide all data related to their evidentiary submissions at the most disaggregated level possible. The Board’s rules require applicants to provide the data that they used to produce the evidence they submitted—which in this case is the subset of Transearch data and the modified DAT data provided in Applicants’ workpapers.”

• UP and NS “provided a complete impact analysis and operating plan” (see p. 24). The railroads pointed out that the STB’s “rules do not require applicants to use other Class I railroads’ traffic tapes to provide a complete application. To the contrary, the Board’s rules provide that applicants can obtain those traffic tapes only if other Class I railroads first request applicants’ traffic tapes. Even then, applicants are not required to obtain or use those other Class I railroads’ traffic tapes: the Board’s rules state that ‘applicants may require’ railroads to produce their own traffic tapes in exchange for receiving applicants’ tapes” … Here, Applicants used traffic tapes from other Class I railroads that provided them on a timely basis, but they had no obligation to delay the preparation of the Application because other railroads did not promptly produce traffic tapes. Applicants’ use of the Board’s Carload Waybill Sample data for their impact and traffic diversion analyses is fully
  consistent with past practice in merger proceedings.”

• The application “provides the merger agreement” (see p. 25). “Applicants’ competitors are unhappy because, in responding to discovery requests seeking the disclosure schedules accompanying the merger agreement, Applicants produced the voluminous schedules but redacted one of the schedules to protect privileged material,” UP and NS told the STB. “The schedule at issue addresses the allocation of regulatory risk between UPC [UP] and NSC [NS], and the redacted material does not alter the terms of the underlying transaction. More specifically, the schedule identifies the outer limits of conditions to the merger that UPC is obligated to NSC to accept. Commenting parties’ interest in information is obvious: they would have a tremendous benefit in bargaining for concessions if they knew UPC’s bottom line. However, UPC’s bottom line should have no bearing on either the conditions parties request or those the Board determines are appropriate to impose. The schedule at issue is shielded from discovery by recognized privileges. Commenting parties may disagree with Applicants’ privilege assertions, but such issues can and should be adjudicated through the discovery process. A discovery dispute regarding Applicants’ assertion of privilege is not a basis for rejecting the Application as incomplete.”

• The application “appropriately addresses issues regarding applicants’ control of other rail carrier entities” (see p. 27). UP and NS reported, for example, that “CSX contends that the Application is incomplete because it implicitly seeks control of the Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad (‘NPBL’) without filing a separate related control application. As explained more thoroughly in a separate submission on this issue by Norfolk Southern [scroll down to download], CSX is wrong. The Application is forward-looking, seeking authority for Union Pacific to acquire whatever interests Norfolk Southern is legally authorized to hold. The Board has stated that it will issue a decision in Docket No. FD 36836 regarding Norfolk Southern’s application to control NPBL by April 2026. If the Board grants that application, then Norfolk Southern’s control of NPBL will be treated the same as Norfolk Southern’s control of any other carrier subsidiary. If the Board denies the request, then Norfolk Southern will be required to divest sufficient shares so that it does not control NPBL. Either way, no separate related application was required. The two proceedings are unrelated and should proceed separately.”

• “Minor map issues do not make the application incomplete” (see p. 30). “CN notes that Applicants’ non-GIS map submitted as Exhibit 1 does not show UP’s overhead trackage rights on NS between Kansas City, Missouri, and Springfield, Illinois, or NS’s haulage rights on UP between Salem, Illinois, and Sidney, Illinois,” UP and NS told the STB. “Applicants regret the omissions and will be filing a corrected Exhibit 1, but the issue does not render the Application incomplete.”

• “Workpaper complaints do not make the application incomplete” (see p. 31). “Finally, BNSF vaguely asserts there have been ‘issues receiving and accessing Applicants’ work papers,’” UP and NS reported. “Applicants recognize some—but not all—parties have had difficulties addressing the workpapers because of the size of the files. Applicants also recognize that there might be questions about certain workpapers. This is bound to be the case in a filing the size of the Application. Applicants have been working diligently to answer the questions they have received, and they are committed to promptly addressing and resolving any issues related to workpaper access … The existence of a few issues with such a massive production is not a reason to reject the Application as incomplete.”

The STB is expected rule on the UP-NS application’s completeness by Jan. 16 or Jan. 20, starting the formal evaluation process, or sending UP and NS back to the drawing board to make adjustments and resubmit.

For merger resources, visit https://www.stb.gov/resources/major-railroad-mergers/ and https://www.up-nstranscontinental.com/.

• BNSF, CN, CPKC, CSX, NGFA: UP+NS Merger Application ‘Incomplete’
• Former Rail Executive: UP-NS Deal Likely to Get Done & Other Views
• Merging Lines – First Take on UP-NS Application
• How Railroads Can Deliver What Congress Promised: Better Infrastructure
• CPKC: UP+NS Merger ‘Not in the Public Interest’
• UP, NS Deliver 6,700-Page ‘Christmas Present’
• UP, NS Shareholders Greenlight Merger
• UP 3Q25: ‘Continued Improvements in Pursuit of What’s Possible’
• For NS 3Q25, ‘Strong Results’
• ASLRRA to Participate in STB Review of Proposed UP-NS Merger
• Is a UP-NS ‘Fix’ In? Don’t Bet on It!
• Why a Unified Rail Network Makes Sense
• A Rail Merger to Put America Back on Track
• UP’s Jalali: No Hiccups With NS IT Integration
• 64 Industry Organizations to the STB: ‘Proceed With Great Care’
• Ag-State Senators to STB: Be ‘Rigorous’ and ‘Comprehensive’
• BNSF vs. UP, Take Three
• Eliminating Paper Barriers is the Pro-Competitive Move
• Hoeven, Klobuchar to STB: ‘Closely Scrutinize’ UP+NS

The post UP+NS Merger Application ‘Complete’? appeared first on Railway Age.

Jeff Thurman, a member of BLET Division 172 in Fort Worth, Texas, became the newest member of the BLET Advisory Board when he was sworn into office on Jan. 1, 2026.

Thurman fills a vacancy on the Advisory Board created by the retirement of Vice President Pete Semenek. Immediately prior to his elevation to the Advisory Board, Thurman was serving as General Chairman of the BNSF (former STL-SF) General Committee of Adjustment, a position he has held since June of 2013. Per the GCA’s bylaws, Vice Chairman Kyle King will become the new General Chairman of the BNSF (STL-SF) GCA.

“Jeff Thurman brings a wealth of knowledge to the Advisory Board with more than 12 years of experience as a General Chairman. He is well-respected by the members he represents and will be a strong addition to the BLET Advisory Board,” said BLET National President Mark Wallace.

Mike Flynn has been appointed as NYCDOT Commissioner following his swearing in during a midnight ceremony in the old City Hall subway station.

The appointment—the very first move made by Zohran Mamdani as Mayor— “underscores the administration’s commitment to delivering an affordability agenda through safer streets, faster buses, and transportation systems that work for working New Yorkers.”

Flynn brings more than two decades of experience across the public and private sectors, “helping cities envision and implement transportation systems that advance economic opportunity, social equity, and environmental sustainability.” His appointment, the Office of the Mayor says, “reflects the Mamdani administration’s focus on pairing bold policy goals, including fast and free buses and safer streets, with deep operational expertise.”

Most recently, Flynn led the New York office of TYLin City Solutions (formerly Sam Schwartz Engineering) where he supported teams of engineers, planners, designers, and community outreach specialists working across disciplines to solve complex transportation, development, and infrastructure challenges throughout the New York City region. As Vice President and Sector Manager for New York and the Northeast, Flynn oversaw major projects at the intersection of mobility, land use, and public space.

Previously, Flynn spent nearly a decade at NYCDOT, where he held senior leadership roles including Director of Capital Planning and Project Initiation. In that role, he guided the planning and delivery of major capital street improvement projects supporting traffic safety, bus priority, and new public spaces citywide. Earlier at DOT, Flynn worked on pedestrian and bicycle programs and transportation planning initiatives that helped reshape how New Yorkers move through the city, including leading the development of the City’s first Street Design Manual.

“High-quality, reliable public transit and safe, well-designed streets allow New Yorkers to get to work without worry, travel on multiple modalities, receive the daily necessities they need, and explore new corners of the five boroughs. Our City deserves a Department of Transportation Commissioner that recognizes the critical role that street infrastructure, road design, and excellent public transportation play in making this city an affordable, safe and dignified home for millions. That is the leadership I see in Mike Flynn, who has spent decades improving the way we walk and ride through our city—and will continue this work in City Hall,” said Mamdani.

“I am honored by the trust Mayor Zohran Mamdani has placed in me to lead the Department of Transportation and work alongside this team to deliver for New Yorkers. Transportation is essential to affordability and quality of life, it determines how people get to work, school, and home safely. I look forward to building a DOT that moves faster, puts safety first, and delivers real wins for working New Yorkers,” said Flynn. 

The post People News: BLET, NYCDOT appeared first on Railway Age.

The backbone of RBMN’s Anthracite business “continues to be the booming domestic market,” which mainly supports American steel production, according to the Class II. This business segment grew nearly 20% in 2025 with most of the shipments going to electric-arc furnace (EAF) steel mills located across the country.

To support this growing market, RBMN purchased additional covered hopper railcars in mid-December with delivery expected in January or February. This equipment will be added to a fleet of nearly 2,000 railcars owned by the railroad. With continued growth expected in the domestic market in 2026, RBMN says it will continue to purchase additional equipment to support the demand.

The post RBMN Anthracite Coal Business Surges in 2025 appeared first on Railway Age.

Minnesota’s Northstar Commuter rail made its last run on January 4, bringing to an end 16 years of commuter rail service in the Twin Cities.

Launched in 2009 to operate between Minneapolis and Big Lake, Minn., the decision to end the service came this past summer as the trains never recovered post-pandemic ridership and expenses outpaced subsidies. A restrictive contract with host BNSF also prevented service expansion. A new express bus route was put in place on January 5. It’s unclear what will happen to the equipment, a fleet of MP36s and double-decker cars. 

—Otto M. Vondrak

The post Northstar Calls it Quits appeared first on Railfan & Railroad Magazine.